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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court’s decision in Knick v. Township of Scott was an
But for many
important milestone in takings jurisprudence.1
observers, it was even more significant because of its potential
implications for the doctrine of stare decisis.2 Knick overruled a key
part of a 34-year-old decision, Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank.3 Some fear that the Knick decision
signals the start of a campaign by the Court’s conservative majority that
will lead to the ill-advised overruling of other precedents. In his dissent
in Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, a recent case overruling a different
40-year-old precedent, Justice Stephen Breyer complained that
“[t]oday’s decision can only cause one to wonder which cases the Court
will overrule next.”4 Less than six weeks later, Justice Elena Kagan
referenced Breyer’s statement in her dissenting opinion in Knick:
“[w]ell, that didn’t take long. Now one may wonder yet again.”5
Such fears are, to some extent, understandable, given ideological
and jurisprudential differences between the justices and the deep
ideological polarization in American society generally. However, at
least when it comes to Knick, they are misplaced. This Article explains
why the Knick Court was justified in overruling Williamson County,
based on both the Supreme Court’s own established rules for
overruling precedent and on leading theories of stare decisis advanced

1. 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2019).
2. See Ilya Somin, Knick v. Township of Scott: Ending a “Catch 22” that Barred
Takings Cases from Federal Court, 2018–2019 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 153, 171 (2019)
[hereinafter Somin, Knick]; cf. Tadhg A.J. Dooley & David Roth, Supreme Court
NAT’L
L.
REV.
(June
26,
2019),
Update,
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-update-knick-v-township-scottno-17-647-nc-dep-t-revenue-v-kimberley
[https://perma.cc/B9P8-4A5C]
(“Knick stands on its own as an important constitutional takings decision, but may well
be remembered most as another example of the Roberts Court chipping away at
longstanding precedent”); Henry Gass, Overruled: Is Precedent in Danger at the
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(June
25,
2019),
Supreme
Court?,
https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2019/0625/Overruled-Is-precedent-indanger-at-the-Supreme-Court [https://perma.cc/K3SM-S6QF].
3. 473 U.S. 172 (1985); see Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167.
4. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1506 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2190 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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by individual justices and prominent legal scholars, both originalists
and living constitutionalists.
Knick reversed a key provision of Williamson County that created
what Chief Justice John Roberts described as a “Catch-22”: preventing
property owners from filing takings cases against state and local
governments in federal court.6 Under Williamson County, a property
owner who claimed that the government had taken her property and
therefore owed her “just compensation” under the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, could not file a case in federal court without first
securing a “final decision” from the relevant state regulatory agency
and “exhausting” all possible remedies in state court.7 Takings claims
were not considered “ripe” for adjudication until these two
prerequisites were met.8 The validity of this second “exhaustion”
requirement was the point at issue in Knick.
Even after both Williamson County requirements were met, it was
still essentially impossible to bring a federal claim because procedural
rules precluded federal courts from reviewing final decisions in cases
initially brought in state court.9 In San Remo Hotel v. City and County
of San Francisco, the Court ruled that a final decision in a takings case
from a state court precluded relitigation of the same issue in federal
court.10 As Chief Justice Roberts explained in his majority opinion in
Knick, “[t]he takings plaintiff thus finds himself in a Catch-22: He
cannot go to federal court without going to state court first; but if he
goes to state court and loses, his claim will be barred in federal court.
The federal claim dies aborning.”11
To make this system even more absurd, some state and local
governments defending against takings claims even exercised their
right to “remove” the case to federal court (on the grounds that it
raised a federal question).12 They then successfully moved to get the
case dismissed because the property owner did not manage to first
“exhaust” state court remedies, as required by Williamson County —
a failure caused by the defendants’ own choice to have the case
removed.13 All of this, at the very least, made Williamson County a

6. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167.
7. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 186, 194–95.
8. See id.
9. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167.
10. 545 U.S. 323, 336 (2005).
11. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167.
12. The federal question jurisdiction statute is found at 28 U.SC. § 1331 (1948).
13. See, e.g., Warner v. City of Marathon, 718 F. App’x 834, 840 (11th Cir. 2017)
(dismissing a takings claim removed to federal court under Williamson County);
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strong candidate for overruling under any reasonable approach to stare
decisis. Even if some incorrect precedents should be allowed to stand,
Williamson County was sufficiently egregious that perhaps it should
not have been one of them.
The rule of deference to precedent derives from the Latin maxim
stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means “to stand by things
decided and not disturb settled points.”14 Deciding whether to
overrule a precedent requires addressing two issues: whether the
precedent in question is correct or incorrect, and determining the
necessary justifications for overruling an erroneous precedent.15 If
judges conclude that the challenged precedent was wrongly decided,
they must decide whether to improve the law by correcting perceived
mistakes or letting the mistakes remain in order to preserve reliance
interests and respect for the rule of law.16
If Williamson County was correctly decided, then it would obviously
follow that the Knick Court was wrong to overrule it. Stare decisis only
comes into play in a situation where the precedent in question was
wrong as an initial matter, but it can be argued that it should be
maintained nonetheless. As a prominent recent treatise on judicial
precedent puts it, stare decisis enters the picture “when a court has
determined that the prior decision was wrongly decided.”17 Justice
Antonin Scalia similarly emphasized that “[t]he whole function of the
doctrine [of stare decisis] is to make us say that what is false under
proper analysis, must nonetheless be held to be true, all in the interest
of stability.”18 A recent Supreme Court decision frankly avows that
“[r]especting stare decisis means sticking with some wrong
decisions.”19

Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d 1412, 1418 (11th Cir. 1994) (same). The Supreme
Court ruled that such “removal” shenanigans were permissible, despite the fact that
the removed claim would not be “ripe” under Williamson County. City of Chicago v.
Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997).
14. BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 5 (2016)
(quoting BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 841 (3d ed.
2011)).
15. See RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 12
(2017).
16. See id. at 4.
17. GARNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 391.
18. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 139 (1997).
19. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015).
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Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the reasons why Williamson
County was wrongly decided,20 and why the Knick Court was justified
in overruling it on the merits — at least aside from the doctrine of stare
decisis. This Article’s purpose is not to defend Knick’s rejection of
Williamson County against those who believe the latter was correctly
decided.21 Rather, for present purposes, we assume that Williamson
County was indeed wrong, and consider whether the Knick Court
should have nonetheless, refused to overrule it because of the doctrine
of stare decisis. However, as discussed more fully below, the reasons
why Williamson County was wrong are relevant to assessing the Knick
Court’s decision to reverse it rather than keeping it in place out of
deference to precedent.
Part II shows that Knick’s overruling of Williamson County was
amply justified based on the Supreme Court’s existing criteria for
overruling constitutional decisions, which may be called its “precedent
on overruling precedent.” While that doctrine is not a model of clarity,
Knick’s application of it to Williamson County turns out to be
relatively straightforward. Part II also addresses Justice Elena Kagan’s
claim in her Knick dissent, that the majority’s conclusion “requires
declaring precedent after precedent after precedent wrong,” thereby
reversing numerous cases that long predate Knick.22
Part III explains why the overruling of Williamson County was
justified based on the current leading originalist theories of precedent
advanced by prominent legal scholars,23 and by Supreme Court Justice
Clarence Thomas in his recent concurring opinion in Gamble v. United
States.24 The key consideration here is that Williamson County itself
had no basis in original meaning.
Part IV assesses the overruling of Williamson County from the
standpoint of prominent modern “living constitutionalist” and
pragmatic theories of precedent. Here too, it turns out that overruling
was well-justified. In sum, the result in Knick is defensible based on a
wide range of different approaches to stare decisis.

20. One of the authors has written about these issues in greater detail in an earlier
article. See Somin, Knick, supra note 2, at 153, 157–71, 181–84.
21. For criticism of Knick, see Stewart E. Sterk & Michael Pollack, A Knock on
Knick’s Revival of Federal Takings Litigation, 72 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3449281 [https://perma.cc/6YU5QB3C].
22. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2186 (2019) (Kagan, J. dissenting).
23. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Theory and Precedent: A Public
Meaning Approach, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 451 (2018) (providing a helpful overview of
such theories).
24. 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1980–89 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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I. WHY WILLIAMSON COUNTY WAS WRONG

This Part summarizes the reasons why Williamson County was
wrong to require takings plaintiffs to “exhaust” remedies in state court
before filing a claim in federal court.25 The Knick majority was
therefore justified in eliminating this requirement — setting aside (for
the moment) the doctrine of precedent. These reasons are relevant to
any assessment of arguments that the relevant precedent should be
preserved for the sake of stare decisis. Under many theories of stare
decisis, whether an erroneous precedent should be preserved depends
in large part on the reasons why it was wrong, and on the relative
egregiousness of the error. This Article does not attempt to provide
anything approaching a complete defense of the reasons for believing
Williamson County was wrong.26 We seek only to briefly lay out those
reasons so they can then be considered in analyzing the stare decisis
issue.
Knick arose from a dispute over alleged centuries-old gravesites.27
Rose Mary Knick owned a 90-acre farm in the Township of Scott,
Pennsylvania.28 Members of her family had owned the land since
1970.29 Beginning in 2008, some other area residents claimed that there
were old gravesites on the Knick property and sought access to them.
In December 2012, the Township enacted Ordinance 12-12-20-001,
which required “[a]ll cemeteries . . . be kept open and accessible to the
general public during daylight hours.”30
In April 2013, the Township’s code enforcement officer entered the
property and concluded that several stones on the land were actually
gravestones, and therefore, the land qualified as a “cemetery” under
the ordinance.31 Under the ordinance, Knick would have had to pay
between $300 and $600 in daily fines for each day the public and
township enforcement officials did not have daylight access to the
“cemetery.”32

25. See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
194 (1985)).
26. See generally Somin, Knick, supra note 2, at 157–71 (arguing in detail why
Williamson County was wrongly decided).
27. See id. at 155–56.
28. See Brief for Petitioner at 3–7, Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162
(2019) (No. 17-647).
29. See id. at 4.
30. Scott Township, Pa., Ordinance 12-12-20-001 § 5 (Dec. 20, 2012).
31. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 28, at 6.
32. See id. at 4–7.
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Knick filed a lawsuit in state court challenging the ordinance,
arguing that it amounted to an uncompensated taking in violation of
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The state court dismissed
the case on procedural grounds.33 After failing to secure a decision on
the merits in state court, Knick filed a takings claim in federal court.34
Citing Williamson County, both the district court and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed the case because Knick’s
takings claim was not ripe for review.35 As the district court ruling
explained, Williamson County required two prerequisites for an asapplied takings challenge:
(1) ‘the government entity charged with implementing the regulations
has reached a final decision regarding the application of the
regulations to the property at issue’ (the ‘finality rule’), and (2) the
plaintiff has unsuccessfully exhausted the state’s procedures for
seeking ‘just compensation,’ so long as the procedures provided by
the state were adequate.36

Because Knick’s claim was a facial challenge to the Township’s
ordinance, she did not need to satisfy the “finality rule,” but was still
required to satisfy the “exhaustion” requirement by first seeking just
compensation in state court in order for her claim to be ripe.37 There
is little doubt that the lower courts applied Williamson County
correctly, thereby creating a potential opportunity for the Supreme
Court to reconsider the second prong of the precedent, which required
exhaustion of the claim in state court.
The most obvious reason why Williamson County’s state-exhaustion
requirement was wrong is that it is at odds with the text of the Fifth
Amendment. The relevant part of that text states that “nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”38
As Chief Justice Roberts puts it in his majority opinion in Knick:
[The Clause] . . . does not say: “[n]or shall private property be taken
for public use, without an available procedure that will result in
compensation.” If a local government takes private property without
paying for it, that government has violated the Fifth Amendment —

33. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168.
34. Id.
35. See Knick v. Township of Scott, 862 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2017); Knick v.
Township of Scott, 2016 WL 4701549, *5–6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2016).
36. Knick, 2016 WL 4701549 at *5 (quoting Cty. Concrete Corp. v. Town of
Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning
Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 194–95 (1985)).
37. Id.; see also Knick, 862 F.3d at 323.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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just as the Takings Clause says — without regard to subsequent state
court proceedings.39

The text of the Takings Clause indicates that the key trigger for
liability and compensation is the taking itself, not the state court’s
subsequent possible decision upholding the taking. During whatever
period in which the government has taken the property, but failed to
provide compensation, there is a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Justice Kagan’s counterargument — that “the text does not say:
‘[n]or shall private property be taken for public use, without advance
or contemporaneous payment of just compensation, notwithstanding
ordinary procedures’” — ignores the fact that property rights exist in
time, as well as in space.40 It is a long-established principle of takings
law that if the government takes private property for only a limited
period of time, it must still pay just compensation for that period.41
Under Justice Kagan’s approach, there would be no violation of the
Takings Clause until “the property owner comes away from the
government’s compensatory procedure empty-handed.”42
This inference from the text is backed by the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which “incorporated” the Fifth Amendment
and all or most of the rest of the Bill of Rights against the states.43 The
Amendment’s framers sought to ensure that property rights would be
protected against uncompensated takings by state governments; this
issue was a major priority of theirs, as they feared that southern states
would seek to undermine the property rights of African-Americans
and whites who had sided with the Union during the recently
concluded Civil War.44
In addition to being at odds with the text and original meaning, the
Williamson County “Catch-22” also created a double standard under
which property rights claimants under the Takings Clause were denied
access to federal court in situations where access is routinely granted

39. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2170.
40. Id. at 2184 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
41. See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 10 (1949) (applying
that rule); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377–78 (1946) (same);
United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 374–75 (1945) (same). For an
overview of the Court’s jurisprudence on temporary takings, see Daniel L. Siegel &
Robert Meltz, Temporary Takings: Settled Principles and Unresolved Questions, 11
VT. J. ENVTL. L. 479, 480 (2010).
42. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2184 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
43. For a general account of incorporation and the motivations behind it, see
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 163–294
(1998).
44. See Somin, Knick, supra note 2, at 160–62.
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to other types of constitutional claims.45 Many such claims could also
have been treated as not “ripe” until the plaintiffs had exhausted all
possible state court remedies. Examples include suits challenging prior
restraints on speech and racial and ethnic discrimination in state
university admissions, among others.46
Attempts to prove that Williamson County was not an unusual case
by analogizing it to restrictions on habeas challenges to state court
violations of criminal defendants’ rights are unpersuasive. Such
comparisons run afoul of the fact that the restrictions in question do
not create a categorical bar to such challenges and are, at least in part,
authorized by a statute enacted by Congress.47
Similarly unavailing are oft-heard claims that takings claims should
be consigned to state court because state judges have special expertise
on these issues, exceeding that of federal judges.48 Such reasoning
would justify relegating numerous other constitutional rights claims to
state court, on the basis of supposedly superior expertise, including free
speech cases, First Amendment Establishment Clause cases, and
others.49
It is sometimes argued that property rights issues are a special case
because state law defines what qualifies as “property.”50 This theory,
however, does not give state courts any special expertise advantage
greater than that which they enjoy in many other cases where the

45. Id. at 163.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 169–71. We do not, however, mean to suggest that these restrictions
on habeas claims are justified. We are sympathetic to many of the concerns about them
raised by critics. See, e.g., Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and

the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the
Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly
Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1219––20 (2015); Lynn Adelman,
Who
Killed
Habeas
Corpus?,
DISSENT
2–3
(2018),

https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/who-killed-habeas-corpus-bill-clinton-aedpastates-rights [https://perma.cc/Z52N-59E4].
48. See, e.g., Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2187 (2019) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting); Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and
Local Land Use Decisions, 59 MD. L. REV. 464, 494 (2000); Frank I. Michelman,

Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial
Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 305 (1993); Stewart E. Sterk, The
Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 226–

28 (2004).
49. See Somin, Knick, supra note 2, at 164–65; see also Ilya Somin, Federalism and
Property Rights, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 53, 80–86 (2011) [hereinafter Somin,
Federalism and Property Rights] (criticizing such arguments with respect to
constitutional property right issues more generally).
50. See, e.g., Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2187–88 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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outcome may depend in part on interpretations of state and local law.51
In addition, this point only applies to one term in the Takings Clause
— “property” — but not to the interpretation of other key terms,
including “take” and “just compensation.” These are defined by
federal constitutional law, and it is their definitions that are at issue in
many Takings Clause cases, including Knick, where the critical dispute
was not over whether Knick owned the land in question, but whether
the government had “taken” her rights.52 Moreover, property rights
are not solely defined by state law, but also have roots in natural rights
theory.53
Finally, it is important to emphasize that access to federal court is
not just a minor procedural issue, with little or no practical import. In
some situations, it is an essential safeguard enabling property owners
to avoid political bias in state courts.54 It also ensures that a minimum
floor of federal constitutional rights is enforced throughout the
nation.55 As Justice Joseph Story noted in the classic 1816 Supreme
Court decision, Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, one of the main reasons why
federal courts have jurisdiction over federal constitutional issues is “the
importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout
the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the
constitution.”56
In sum, Williamson County was wrongly decided because it created
a Catch-22 that violated the text and original meaning of the Fifth
Amendment and established a blatant double-standard under which
takings claims were systematically treated worse than other
constitutional-rights cases. It also denied takings plaintiffs access to
federal courts that, in some cases, might be essential to shielding them
against biased state courts.
II. KNICK AND THE COURT’S EXISTING PRECEDENT ON
OVERRULING PRECEDENT

The Knick majority’s decision to overrule Williamson County is
consistent with the Court’s own previously stated criteria for overruling
constitutional precedent.57 We might call that doctrine the Court’s
51. Somin, Knick, supra note 2, at 165; see also Somin, Federalism and Property
Rights, supra note 49, at 84–86 (offering more extended analysis of this point).
52. See supra notes 27–36 and accompanying text.
53. See Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, supra note 49, at 86.
54. See Somin, Knick, supra note 2, at 181–82.
55. See id. at 182–83.
56. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347–48 (1816) (Story, J.).
57. See Somin, Knick, supra note 2, at 172.
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“precedent about precedent.” Although that precedent is not entirely
clear, Knick is well within its scope.
A. Williamson County and the Court’s Criteria for Reversal of
Constitutional Precedent

The Supreme Court has stated that it will “overrule an erroneously
decided precedent . . . if: (1) its foundations have been ‘eroded’ by
subsequent decisions; (2) it has been subject to ‘substantial and
continuing’ criticism; and (3) it has not induced ‘individual or societal
reliance’ that counsels against overturning” it.58 Some cases also
highlight the “workability” of the precedent in question.59
An additional factor that the Court considers is whether the original
decision was “well reasoned.”60 Furthermore, as Chief Justice Roberts
points out in Knick, the doctrine of stare decisis “‘is at its weakest when
we interpret the Constitution,’ as we did in Williamson County,
because only this Court or a constitutional amendment can alter our
holdings.”61
Williamson County easily fits within these criteria. That decision
embedded a double standard against takings claims, which treats them
But that
less favorably than other constitutional rights claims.62
approach has been “eroded” by later Supreme Court decisions that
explicitly caution against treating the Takings Clause — and property
rights generally — as the “poor relation” of constitutional law.63
Recent decisions have gradually cut back on other areas where takings
claims have been disfavored relative to other constitutional rights
cases.64 In addition, post-Williamson County rulings have held that
local government land-use regulations can be challenged in federal

58. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 587 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal
citations omitted).
59. Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2481 (2018).
60. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792–93 (2009).
61. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2177 (2019) (internal citation
omitted).
62. See supra Part I.
63. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) (holding that there is “no
reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of
Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the
status of a poor relation”).
64. See generally Ilya Somin, Two Steps Forward for the “Poor Relation” of
Constitutional Law: Koontz, Arkansas Game & Fish, and the Future of the Takings
Clause, 2012–2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 215 (2013) [hereinafter Somin, Two Steps
Forward] (discussing two notable examples of such recent decisions).
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court on other constitutional grounds, such as the First Amendment.65
These developments make Williamson County even more anomalous
than it was before.
There is also little doubt that Williamson County has been subject
to “substantial and continuing” criticism.66 As Chief Justice Roberts
notes, “[t]he decision has come in for repeated criticism over the years
from Justices of this Court and many respected commentators.”67 The
ruling has been the object of widespread criticism by legal scholars who
decry the Catch-22 problem and other aspects of the ruling.68
Perhaps more importantly, in a concurring opinion in San Remo
Hotel, then-Chief Justice William Rehnquist noted that Williamson
County had severe flaws, was inconsistent with the Court’s treatment
of other constitutional rights, and “ha[d] created some real anomalies,
justifying our revisiting the issue.”69 Justice Rehnquist wrote that,
although he had joined in the Williamson County ruling back in 1985,
he had since come to believe that the state-litigation requirement of
Justice Rehnquist’s
that ruling “may have been mistaken.”70
concurrence was joined by three other members of the Court: Justices

65. See, e.g., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–50 (1986) (deciding
a First Amendment challenge to restrictions on locations of adult businesses).
66. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 587 (2003) (Scalia J., dissenting) (internal
citations omitted).
67. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178 (2019) (citing examples).
68. For examples of the many critiques, see Peter A. Buchsbaum, Should Land Use
Be Different? Reflections on Williamson County Regional Planning Board v.
Hamilton Bank, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
PERSPECTIVES 471, 473–74 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002); Michael M. Berger &
Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can’t Get There from Here: Supreme Court
Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-Parody Stage,
36 URB. L. 671, 673 (2004); Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness
Ruse in Regulatory Takings, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 102–03 (2000); David
Breemer, Overcoming Williamson County’s Troubling State Procedures Rule: How

the England Reservation, Issue Preclusion Exceptions, and the Inadequacy Exception
Open the Federal Courthouse Door to Ripe Takings Claims, 18 FLA. ST. J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 209 (2003); Joshua D. Hawley, The Beginning of the End? Horne v.
Department of Agriculture and the Future of Williamson County, 2012–2013 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 245 (2013); R.S. Radford & Jennifer Fry Thompson, The Accidental
Abstention Doctrine: After Thirty Years, the Case for Diverting Federal Takings
Claims to State Court Under Williamson County Has Yet to Be Made, 67 BAYLOR L.
REV. 567 (2015); Ilya Somin, Supreme Court Will Hear Important Property Rights
REASON:
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Mar.
5,
2018),
Case,
https://reason.com/volokh/2018/03/05/supreme-court-will-hear-important-proper
[https://perma.cc/N79B-P8VT] [hereinafter Somin, Supreme Court].
69. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 351
(2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
70. Id. at 348.

2020]

OVERTURNING A CATCH-22

557

Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O’Connor, and Clarence Thomas.71
Justice O’Connor was also on the Court in 1985 and joined in the
Williamson County majority. Few Supreme Court decisions have been
so seriously questioned by four members of the Court, including two
who initially supported it.72 If this does not qualify as “substantial and
continuing criticism,” it is hard to imagine what does.
When it comes to “workability,” the Catch-22 created by the
combination of Williamson County and San Remo has, as Roberts
emphasized, made the decisions’ rules “unworkable.”73 If any
procedural rule qualifies as such, it is one where the very action that is
a prerequisite to filing a case in federal court also prevents the plaintiff
from doing so. The ability of defendants to defeat takings cases by
“removing” them to federal court, and then getting them dismissed for
lack of conformity to Williamson County further demonstrates the
unworkable nature of the state exhaustion requirement.74
For reasons discussed elsewhere in this Article, the reasoning of
Williamson County is unusually bad.75 This flaw supports its reversal.
As Chief Justice Roberts puts it, the decision “was not just wrong. Its
reasoning was exceptionally ill-founded and conflicted with much of
our takings jurisprudence.”76
The reversal of Williamson County does admittedly upset some
reliance interests. Some state and local governments that might
otherwise have prevailed in takings cases filed in state court will
probably now lose them in federal court. However, as Chief Justice
Roberts points out, the Court does not usually give credence to
reliance interests that depend on rules that do not “‘serve as a guide to
lawful behavior’ . . . . Our holding that uncompensated takings violate
the Fifth Amendment will not expose governments to new liability; it
will simply allow into federal court takings claims that otherwise would
have been brought as inverse condemnation suits in state court.”77 If
an uncompensated restriction on property rights is constitutionally
valid, the government should be able to defend it successfully in federal

71. Id.
72. We cannot think of another fully comparable example in constitutional law
between the period when Williamson County was decided, and the present — a
decision that has been severely criticized by four or more Supreme Court Justices,
including two of those who were part of the majority that initially decided the case.
73. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178–79 (2019).
74. See supra Part I.
75. See supra Part I; see also Somin, Knick, supra note 2, at 157–59.
76. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2178.
77. Id. at 2179 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995)).
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court. Constitutionally valid policies do not require the protection of
the Williamson County doctrine, and such protection is not extended
against any other types of constitutional claims.
Ultimately, the only “reliance interests” Williamson County
protects are those of state and local governments that engaged in
uncompensated takings that would be struck down in federal court but
upheld by state courts that are biased in their favor or erroneously
interpret relevant federal takings precedent. That is not an interest
anywhere near strong enough to justify continuing to bar an entire
category of constitutional rights cases from access to federal court.
Chief Justice Roberts also effectively responds to Justice Kagan’s
argument that Williamson County should be given the “enhanced”
form of stare decisis deference usually applied to statutory decisions
because Congress could reverse it by enacting a statute eliminating the
“preclusion” trap the Court upheld in San Remo Hotel.78 This would
only partly fix the problems Williamson County created, as there would
still be a double standard between takings claims and other
constitutional rights. As Roberts points out:
[T]akings plaintiffs, unlike plaintiffs bringing any other constitutional
claim, would still have been forced to pursue relief under state law
before they could bring suit in federal court. Congress could not have
lifted that unjustified exhaustion requirement because, under
Williamson County, a property owner had no federal claim until a
state court denied him compensation.79

Moreover, if applied consistently, Justice Kagan’s argument would
justify giving enhanced status to any precedents establishing judicially
created barriers to bringing constitutional rights claims in federal court,
so long as Congress could potentially reverse or mitigate them.
B. Is Knick at Odds with “Precedent after Precedent after
Precedent”?

In addition to defending Williamson County on the grounds of stare
decisis, Justice Kagan’s dissent argues that the Knick majority
implicitly overruled numerous precedents going back to the 1890 case
of Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co.80 She contends
that the majority’s approach “requires declaring precedent after

78. Id. at 2189 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 2179.
80. 135 U.S. 641 (1890). For Justice Kagan’s discussion of these cases, see Knick,
139 S. Ct. at 2182 n.1, 2183–87 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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precedent after precedent wrong.”81 These cases all mandate that the
Takings Clause “‘does not provide or require that compensation shall
be actually paid in advance of the occupancy of the land to be taken’”
provided the government offers “‘reasonable, certain and adequate
provision for obtaining compensation’” after the fact.82
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts argued that these
cases could be explained by the Court’s unwillingness to provide
injunctive relief against takings where the property owner was able to
get compensation.83 Thus, “every one of the cases cited by the dissent
would come out the same way — the plaintiffs would not be entitled to
the relief they requested because they could instead pursue a suit for
compensation.”84 Justice Kagan responds by pointing out that the
distinction between compensation and injunctive relief “played little or
no role in our analyses” in those cases.85
Both Roberts and Kagan ignore a far more significant distinction
between most of the precedents the latter relies on and cases such as
Knick and Williamson County. There is a crucial difference between a
case where the government concedes there is a taking but merely
delays paying compensation, and a situation where the government
denies any taking has occurred at all. By definition, the latter scenario
is not a situation where the government provides “reasonable, certain
and adequate provision for obtaining compensation” after the fact.86
Compensation from the state is uncertain — and thus also potentially
inadequate — for the simple reason that the government denies any
compensation is due at all, and state courts could potentially endorse
that position even if federal courts might have decided the case
differently.
Cases in which both sides agree that compensation is due might be
characterized simply as disputes over the timing and amount of
compensation, which can usually be resolved by factual determinations
about the value of the property in question. By contrast, disputes over
whether a taking has occurred at all are textbook examples of litigation
over whether there has been a violation of federal constitutional law —
precisely the sort of issue that belongs in federal court, if anything does.
While a state court could potentially rule against the government on
the issue of whether a taking has occurred, the same thing could
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2186 (Kagan, J. dissenting).
Id. at 2182 (quoting Cherokee Nation, 135 U.S. at 659).
See id. at 2176–77.
Id.
Id. at 2185 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Cherokee Nation, 135 U.S. at 659.
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happen whenever a state denies that it has violated some other
constitutional right. As prominent takings lawyer Robert Thomas asks
in a critique of Kagan’s opinion:
[I]sn’t there a big difference between an eminent domain quick take
where the government occupies now, with the corresponding
recognition of the absolute obligation to pay whatever the court later
determines is just compensation, and a regulatory taking where the
government is exercising some other power, and absolutely denies
that it needs to pay anything?87

A close look at the pre-Williamson County cases cited by Justice
Kagan shows that all cases brought against state and local governments
(and some brought against the federal government) were in fact cases
where compensation was “certain” because the government had
already conceded a taking had occurred and payment was due. In
Cherokee Nation, the 1890 case to which Kagan traces the doctrine in
question, Congress mandated that “full compensation shall be made to
the owner for all property to be taken” for the construction of a
railroad that would pass through land owned by Native American
tribes.88 Since Congress had already authorized compensation for the
land taken for the railroad, the Court ruled that “this provision is
sufficiently reasonable, certain and adequate to secure the just
compensation to which the owner is entitled.”89 The key point,
however, is that “the owner is entitled to reasonable, certain and
adequate provision for obtaining compensation before his occupancy
is disturbed.”90 There can be no such advance assurance of
“reasonable, certain, and adequate” compensation in a case where the
government denies that any compensation is due in the first place.
Virtually all the other cases cited by Justice Kagan are similar.
Those brought against state and local governments (and some against
the federal government) involve scenarios where the government
conceded in advance that compensation is due, and the only issue was
its timing or amount.91 Three cases were brought against the federal

87. Robert H. Thomas, Knick Analysis, Part IV: Why Not Let Sleeping Dogs Lie?
The Dissent and Stare Decisis, INVERSE CONDEMNATION BLOG (June 24, 2019),

https://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2019/06/knick-analysispart-iv.html [https://perma.cc/Z63T-HUG4].
88. Cherokee Nation, 135 U.S. at 659.
89. Id.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. See generally Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 366–70 (1930) (state recognized
duty to compensate and enacted legislation to do so for land taken for a railroad);
Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 677–78 (1923) (city commits to providing
compensation to owners of land taken for the acquisition of water); Albert Hanson

2020]

OVERTURNING A CATCH-22

561

government in situations where the latter denied a taking had
occurred.92 But a takings claim against the federal government must
be heard in federal court, regardless of the issue involved.93 And if the
condemning authority refuses to pay at the time of the taking, the
remedy will have to be an award of compensation paid after the fact,
regardless of exactly which federal court hears the case, and at which
time.
Thus, such cases do not raise the possibility of denying access to
federal court for a federal constitutional claim, and do not change the
nature of the compensation remedy successful plaintiffs stand to
receive. As the Supreme Court noted in one of these decisions, “if the
authorized action in this instance does constitute a taking of property
for which there must be just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment, the Government has impliedly promised to pay that
compensation and has afforded a remedy for its recovery by a suit in
the Court of Claims.”94 The same point applies to Kagan’s citation of
cases involving takings claims brought against the federal government
under the Tucker Act, which requires such cases to be brought in the
Federal Court of Claims.95

Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 581, 586–87 (1923) (government agreed in
advance to provide compensation for land taken by eminent domain); Hays v. Port of
Seattle, 251 U.S. 233, 234–38 (1920) (city formally asserted title over the owner’s
property, thereby essentially conceding that the property had been taken); Bragg v.
Weaver, 251 U.S. 57 (1919) (government recognized obligation to compensate owners
for land taken for purposes of repairing an adjoining road); Madisonville Traction Co.
v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 242–43, 251–54 (1905) (state authorized
compensation for the use of eminent domain to condemn property for a railroad);
Williams v. Parker, 188 U.S. 491, 502–04 (1903) (state legislature recognized liability
and provide compensation for the taking of property by eminent domain, and had the
power to impose that liability on the City of Boston despite lack of “technical”
estoppel); Backus v. Fort St. Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 565–68 (1898) (state
recognized obligation to compensate for damage to property that state law treated as
the equivalent “condemnation” of property interests for the construction of railroad
tracks); Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 400–02 (1895) (state recognized duty to
compensate owners for the takingand allocation of funds for that purpose). These cases
are all cited in Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2182 n.1 (2019) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
92. See Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21–23 (1940); Hurley v.
Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932); Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengensellschaft, 224 U.S.
290, 305–06 (1912).
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2011) (establishing jurisdiction over such claims in
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims).
94. Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 21.
95. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2186 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing several such
cases).
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Kagan’s reliance on late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century
cases brought against state and local governments is problematic for an
additional reason. Those cases were decided before the Supreme
Court recognized that the Takings Clause (and the rest of the Bill of
Rights) was “incorporated” against the states.96 As a result, takings
claims brought against state and local governments in federal court
could only be litigated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, utilizing the Court’s so-called “substantive” due process
doctrine.97 During this era, takings cases decided under the Due
Process Clause were often litigated under rules that gave greater
deference to the government than was applied to those brought under
the Takings Clause (which could only be used against the federal
government).98 Thus, it should not be assumed the former cases
represent the Court’s considered judgment of how takings claims
against states and localities should be handled if the Takings Clause
had applied to them.
In his concurring opinion in Knick, Justice Thomas went further
than Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion, arguing that:
The Fifth Amendment does not merely provide a damages remedy to
a property owner willing to “shoulder the burden of securing
compensation” after the government takes property without paying
for it. Instead, it makes just compensation a “prerequisite” to the
government’s authority to “tak[e] property for public use.” A
“purported exercise of the eminent-domain power” is therefore
“invalid” unless the government “pays just compensation before or at
the time of its taking.”99

Justice Thomas, therefore, rejects the “‘sue me’ approach to the
Takings Clause” under which the government is free to undertake
policies that take private property without paying compensation in
advance or simultaneously with the taking.100 Unlike the majority
opinion, Thomas’s argument probably would require overruling a
substantial number of pre-Williamson County precedents holding that
the Takings Clause does not require advance or contemporaneous
compensation.101

96. For a discussion of the evidence indicating lack of incorporation during this
period and why it matters, see ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF
NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN 50–51, 123–26 (rev. ed. 2016).
97. See id. at 123–26 (discussing this distinction and its importance).
98. See id. at 50–51, 123–24.
99. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2180 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 80–100 and accompanying text.
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Practically speaking, however, the difference between Justice
Thomas’s approach and the majority’s will usually be modest, at most.
Either way, government regulators will sometimes violate the Takings
Clause even if they try, in good faith, to avoid doing so. Regardless,
the practical remedy for any constitutional rights violation would be a
lawsuit for compensation, filed after the fact. 102
III. KNICK AND ORIGINALIST THEORIES OF PRECEDENT

Knick’s reversal of Williamson County is also amply justified under
theories of stare decisis advanced by leading originalists. A key reason
for this conclusion is that the precedent in question has no originalist
justification, and indeed the Williamson County Court did not even
attempt to provide one.
Originalists have proposed several different approaches to dealing
with wrongly decided precedent. Some argue that precedents that
conflict with original meaning should get little or no judicial
deference.103 Others are willing to make exceptions for flawed
precedents that are deeply entrenched in the fabric of society. Neither
of these approaches justifies retaining Williamson County.
A. Theories That Reject All or Nearly All Deference to NonOriginalist Precedents

From the standpoint of theories that reject all or nearly all judicial
deference to incorrect non-originalist precedents, it is fairly obvious
that Williamson County deserved to be overruled, assuming it was
102. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2180 (Thomas, J., concurring) (rejecting the argument
that government regulators should be able to pursue regulatory programs free of the
threat of injunction). One potential difference is that Justice Thomas’s theory might
allow injunctive relief in some situations where Justice Roberts’s would not. But it is
far from clear that there would be any significant number of such cases. As Justice
Thomas notes, “[i]njunctive relief is not available when an adequate remedy exists at
law. And even when relief is appropriate for a particular plaintiff, it does not follow
that a court may enjoin or invalidate an entire regulatory ‘program.’” Id. (internal
citations omitted).
103. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent
Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2007); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case
Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 24–25 (1994); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT.
289, 291 (2005); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101
MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2731–34 (2003); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Document and the
Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 26–27 (2000) (arguing that we should be
“documentarians first; and doctrinalists second” thereby generally privileging “the
amended Constitution’s specific words and word patterns, the historical experiences
that birthed and rebirthed the text, and the conceptual schemas and structures
organizing the document” over judicial precedent).
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flawed in the way we and other critics have described.104 The state
exhaustion requirement is, as Knick concluded, at odds with the text of
the Fifth Amendment, and it also conflicts with the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment’s incorporation of the
Bill of Rights against state and local governments.105
Professor Randy Barnett argues that otherwise-flawed precedent
might still deserve deference in the “construction zone,” where the
issues involved have to do with the implementation of “vague” aspects
of the text and application of the text to complicated factual situations,
rather than the construal of the text’s core meaning.106 This distinction
The state-exhaustion
is unlikely to save Williamson County.
requirement was, in fact, at odds with the text of the Fifth Amendment
itself, not merely some aspect of the implementation in the
“construction zone.”107 Moreover, a Catch-22 that systematically bars
a right from being vindicated in federal court is at odds with the central
purpose of the right in question — and with the goal behind the
Fourteenth Amendment’s incorporation of the right against state and
local governments.108 It, therefore, goes against what Barnett would
call the “core meaning” of the right in question, and would not qualify
as “good faith construction.”109
He further emphasizes that “construction” is only permissible in
situations where the meaning of the relevant constitutional provision is
too “vague” to resolve the issue directly, and must be done in a way
that “furthers the constitutional principles” underlying the provision in
question.110 Williamson County fails both of these tests. The Takings
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment are not too vague to resolve
the issue of when a “taking” has occurred, and the Williamson County

104. See supra Part I.
105. See supra Part I.
106. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical
as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 269 (2005). On the distinction between
“interpretation” and “construction,” see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 118–30 (rev. ed. 2014); see also KEITH
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter
and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 34 (2018); Lawrence
B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 108
(2010).
107. See supra Part I.
108. See supra Part I.
109. See BARNETT, supra note 106, at 124; Barnett & Bernick, supra note 106, at 32–
36.
110. See BARNETT, supra note 106, at 128–30.
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Catch-22 is most definitely at odds with the constitutional principles
these provisions are supposed to vindicate.111
In a recent concurring opinion in Gamble v. United States, Justice
Clarence Thomas, one of the Court’s leading originalists, argued that
“the Court’s typical formulation of the stare decisis standard does not
comport with our judicial duty under Article III because it elevates
demonstrably erroneous decisions — meaning decisions outside the
realm of permissible interpretation — over the text of the Constitution
and other duly enacted federal law.”112 He instead suggests that courts
should only respect possibly erroneous precedent if its “traditional
tools of legal interpretation show that the earlier decision adopted a
textually permissible interpretation of the law,” though even then
deference to erroneous precedent is not mandatory.113 By this, Justice
Thomas clearly means that only precedents that are defensible based
on originalist methodology can be maintained in the face of strong
evidence that they were wrongly decided.114 Similarly, Professor Lee
Strang argues that only originalist precedent deserves deference.115
Larry Solum also suggests that precedent may have greater force in
situations “when the prior decision involved a good faith attempt to
determine the original meaning of the constitutional text,” as opposed
to those “that ignored original meaning or gave decisive weight to
policy judgments about desirable outcomes.”116
From Justice Thomas’s and Strang’s standpoint, the key flaw in
Williamson County is the Court’s failure to attempt to square the stateexhaustion requirement with the text of the Fifth Amendment. Both
in the Court’s opinion and in justifications put forward subsequently
by defenders of the ruling, the only rationales offered are pragmatic
concerns and non-originalist doctrinal considerations.117 Thus, it is not
surprising that Justice Thomas voted with the Knick majority, and

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See supra Part I.
Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct 1960, 1981 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

Id. at 1984.
Id. at 1986.
See generally Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: The Privileged
Place of Originalist Precedent, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1729, 1764–65 (2010).
116. Solum, supra note 23, at 466.
117. These include the ripeness theory underlying Williamson County and various

pragmatic arguments to the effect that state courts are better suited to handle taking
cases than federal courts. See Somin, Knick, supra note 2, at 157–71, 181–87 (for an
overview and critique).

566

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVII

indeed authored a concurring opinion advocating going further in
overruling precedent than the majority did.118
Prominent originalist legal scholar and judge Amy Coney Barrett
similarly advocates for only a “weak” presumption in favor of retaining
precedent in constitutional cases, particularly when the precedent in
question conflicts with the judge’s own methodological priors.119 She
contends that it would be both unwise and unrealistic to demand more
stringent adherence to precedent,120 with the exception of a few
“superprecedents.”121
B. Theories That Permit Retention of Wrong, but Deeply
Entrenched Precedents

Some originalists are willing to carve out a larger space for retaining
flawed precedents than those who reject the idea almost entirely. In
their influential book Originalism and the Good Constitution, John
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport argue that originalist judges should
immunize two types of erroneous precedents from overruling: those
whose reversal would entail “enormous costs” to society, and those
that are so “entrenched” that they have broad enough political support
to have been enacted as constitutional amendments had the courts not
preempted the amendment process with an incorrect interpretation of
Neither of these criteria can save
the existing Constitution.122
Williamson County.
It is fairly obvious that overruling Williamson County will not lead
to anything approaching the kinds of “enormous costs” McGinnis and
Rappaport have in mind. They envision costs on the scale of those that
might be endured if the Court were suddenly to invalidate Social
Security or the use of paper money as legal tender, on originalist
grounds, thereby potentially creating large-scale social and economic
upheaval.123 They also suggest that “enormous costs” might justify
keeping an erroneous precedent in place in any situations where

118. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2180–81 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). See Section II.B for discussion of Justice Thomas’s opinion.
119. See Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 TEX.
L. REV. 1711, 1714–15 (2013).
120. Id. at 1721.
121. See Section III.B for a discussion of this aspect of Judge Barrett’s position.
122. JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD
CONSTITUTION 179–83 (2013); see also John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,

Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case against
Construction, 103 NW. L. REV. 751 (2009).
123. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 122, at 179.
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overturning it would require “a large number of programs” to be struck
down, thereby forcing the legislature to undertake “immediate action”
to avert a crisis.124
Overruling Williamson County does not, in and of itself, require
invalidation of any government programs. It merely allows cases
challenging some of these programs to proceed in federal rather than
state court. While some policies are likely to be ruled takings in federal
court that a state court would have upheld,125 it is highly unlikely this
will result in any “enormous cost” or social crisis. If the programs in
question are truly vital, the state or local government in question can
simply allocate money to pay compensation. In some situations,
ensuring compensation could strengthen the security of property
rights, and thereby actually benefit society by providing stronger
incentives for development and investment. The need for secure
property rights is one of the main insights of modern development
economics.126 Requiring compensation could also help incentivize
state and local governments to consider the costs and benefits of their
regulatory programs more carefully.127 Far from imposing “enormous”
social costs, the reversal of Williamson County could potentially create
substantial benefits.
It is even more unlikely that Williamson County should have been
preserved because it enjoyed such broad support that a constitutional
amendment could have been enacted to enshrine its principles. The
passage of a constitutional amendment requires a broad political
consensus and strong popular support in order to overcome the
supermajority requirements of Article V of the Constitution by
securing the support of two-thirds of both houses of Congress and
three-quarters of state legislatures.128 McGinnis and Rappaport
emphasize that their theory of “entrenched precedent” requires broad
enough popular support to make the passage of an amendment “more
likely than not.”129

124. Id. at 179–80.
125. See; Somin, Knick, supra note 2, at 181–83; Supra Part I
126. See, e.g., ROBERT D. COOTER & HANS-BERND SCHAFER, SOLOMON’S KNOT:
HOW LAW CAN END THE POVERTY OF NATIONS 64–81 (2012); HERNANDO DE SOTO,
THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS
EVERYWHERE ELSE 49–63 (2000). For a recent overview, see Peter J. Boettke &
Rosolino Antonio Candela, Development and Property Rights, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS (Alain Marciano & Giovanni Battista Ramello eds., 2014).
127. On this possibility, see, for example, Somin, Two Steps Forward, supra note 64,
at 234–35.
128. U.S. CONST. art. V.
129. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 122, at 181–83.
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To our knowledge, there is no public opinion polling on Williamson
County or its overruling by Knick. Indeed, it is highly likely that most
of the public is completely unaware of the controversy surrounding
these two cases,130 which is largely confined to specialists in property
law and land-use policy. Significantly, the reversal of Williamson
County was not met by any widespread public outcry, nor have there
been any significant efforts to try to alter Knick through legislation,
such as new laws limiting federal court jurisdiction over takings cases.
A few commentators and officials worried that it might endanger
some land-use regulations, especially in highly restrictive states, such
Rhode Island Democratic Senator Sheldon
as California.131
Whitehouse wrote an op-ed denouncing the decision as “part of a
pattern of 73 cases through the 2018 term where the Republicanappointed justices delivered big wins for big Republican donor
interests.”132 But even these critics did not propose to reverse Knick
by constitutional amendment, nor is there anything even remotely
approaching a broad popular movement to do so.
If Williamson County and Knick somehow did attract widespread
public attention, it is unlikely that a supermajority would prefer the
doctrine of the former. Many voters might reject the idea that an entire
category of constitutional property-rights claims should be denied
access to federal court — a possibility consistent with the strong
negative public reaction against the Court’s 2005 decision in Kelo v.
New London.133 Most of the public perceived that ruling as gutting
protection for property rights against unscrupulous local governments
by allowing the government to take property for private “economic
development.”134 If Williamson County were better known, it
130. Survey data indicates the majority of voters are often ignorant even of far more
prominent political and legal controversies. For an overview of the evidence, see ILYA
SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS
SMARTER 17–46 (2d ed. 2016).
131. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Supreme Court Bolsters Rights for Developers and
Property Owners in California and Elsewhere, L.A. TIMES (June 21, 2019, 8:34 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-supreme-court-property-rights-taking20190621-story.html [https://perma.cc/5SVP-CQVM] (quoting examples).
132. Sheldon Whitehouse, ‘Knick’-Picking: Why a Recent SCOTUS Ruling Signals
a New Day, NAT’L L.J. (July 1, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/opeds/knick-picking-why-a-recent-scotus-ruling-signals-a-new-day
[https://perma.cc/C4RA-VWH7]. Whitehouse also misleadingly described the case as
about “whether states and local courts ought to have first say in disputes over ‘just
compensation’ for landowners[,]” ignoring the “Catch-22” trap that prevented such
cases from ever being considered in federal court under Williamson County. Id.
133. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
134. For an overview of the political reaction against Kelo, see SOMIN, supra note
96, at 112–34.
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probably would not have attracted as much opposition as Kelo. Unlike
Kelo, it is a procedural rule that does not by itself deprive property
owners of substantive rights, even though it may make such deprivation
more likely in some cases.135 But it seems even more unlikely that
Williamson County could ever generate the widespread supermajority
support needed to pass a constitutional amendment based on it.
An important new article by Professor Will Baude on
“constitutional liquidation” argues that the meaning of
“indeterminate” constitutional text can be “liquidated” over time if
there is a longstanding “course of deliberate practice” favoring a given
approach, and if there has been a “constitutional settlement” in which
the “losing side” ultimately “gave up” and acquiesced in the
interpretation it once opposed.136 Baude’s approach focuses primarily
on “liquidation” by “practice” in the political branches of
government.137 But this reasoning presumably applies to judicial
precedents that receive that kind of support.
Under Baude’s criteria, the Court was amply justified in overruling
Williamson County.
Even assuming the Takings Clause is
indeterminate on the issues at stake in Williamson County,138 that
precedent does not meet Baude’s criteria for “liquidation.” And even
if there has been a consistent pattern of practice, the opponents of the
ruling never acquiesced in any kind of “settlement.” Far from giving
up, they continued to oppose Williamson County, and sought its
reversal — ultimately successfully.139
The late Justice Antonin Scalia, arguably the nation’s most
prominent originalist for many years, avowed that “stare decisis is not
part of my originalist philosophy; it is a pragmatic exception to it.”140
This raises an obvious question: when does the exception apply?
Scalia never developed a systematic answer to that query. If stare
decisis requires near-absolute deference to precedent, then Williamson
County should have been preserved — along with virtually every other
Supreme Court precedent, no matter how flawed. However, Scalia’s
writings and opinions suggest that he did not, in fact, practice absolute
adherence to precedent.141 The point of the “pragmatic exception,” in

135. See supra Part I.
136. Will Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16–21 (2019).
137. Id.
138. In our view, it actually is not. See supra Part I.
139. See supra Section II.A.
140. SCALIA, supra note 18, at 140.
141. See infra note 145 (addressing his willingness to overrule precedent on abortion
and affirmative action).
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his view, was to prevent originalism from becoming “too strong to
swallow.”142 Thus, the doctrine was meant to insulate from reversal
such hallowed precedents as Marbury v. Madison, even if historical
research reveals that they are wrong as a matter of original meaning.143
Otherwise, originalism would have — for Scalia — the unacceptable
consequence of reversing precedent backed by a broad societal
consensus, and thereby become unpalatable to modern jurists.144
This consideration, however, would not protect precedents that are
highly controversial, or at least do not enjoy the support of a strong
consensus. Few would argue that reversing precedents of the caliber
of Williamson County would make originalism inherently
unacceptable, even if they might believe the precedent in question
should have been retained. In cases where the precedents at issue were
relatively recent and highly controversial, Scalia was often willing to
overrule those he thought seriously wrong — most notably in cases
involving abortion and affirmative action.145
To the extent there is a consistent pattern to Scalia’s approach to
precedent, it is that he was willing to overrule non-originalist decisions
that he thought were seriously wrong and that did not have the support
of a broad societal consensus. He only seemed unwilling to reverse
what he considered to be incorrect precedent in cases where it would
make originalism too bitter a pill to “swallow.”146 Scalia’s theory seems
to be entirely compatible with overruling Williamson County,
assuming that the decision was wrong for the reasons critics have
claimed.147
Judge Robert Bork, another leading originalist jurist of the same
generation as Scalia, indicated in 1989 that a “clearly wrong” precedent
“should not be overruled” if it is “thoroughly embedded in our national
life.”148 Judge Amy Coney Barrett endorsed a similar notion in a 2013
article, where she suggested that such “superprecedents” have

142. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L.REV. 849, 861 (1989).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (advocating overruling of precedents upholding constitutionality of
racial preferences, including Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990),
which was overruled by the Court in Adarand); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 992–95 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (advocating overruling of Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973)).
146. Scalia, supra note 142, at 861.
147. See supra Part I.
148. Robert H. Bork, The Case Against Political Judging (1989), in ROBERT H.
BORK, A TIME TO SPEAK: SELECTED WRITINGS AND ARGUMENTS 277 (2008).
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effectively been taken out of judicial hands by “the people,” and thus
cannot be reversed.149 These positions resemble the view we have
extrapolated from Scalia’s writings, and also partly prefigure McGinnis
and Rappaport’s theory that originalist judges should not reverse
“entrenched” precedents.150 It seems obvious that Williamson County
does not qualify as such a “thoroughly embedded” precedent.151
Retaining Williamson County might have been justified under
theories holding that long-established precedent should almost always
trump original meaning, even if the precedent in question is seriously
wrong.152 But this approach is at odds with the views of most
prominent originalists. And it would require condemning nearly all
efforts to reverse non-originalist precedents that originalists decry, not
just Williamson County.
Even some of those who advocate a strong form of deference to
erroneous precedent nonetheless concede that overruling might be
justified in situations where a precedent “has become unworkable
or . . . conflicts with other precedent.”153 As we have seen, Williamson
County suffers from both these flaws.154
IV. ASSESSING KNICK UNDER LIVING-CONSTITUTION THEORIES OF
PRECEDENT

Overruling Williamson County would also be compatible with the
living Constitution theories of precedent. Originalism has been
described as “the antithesis of the idea that we have a living
constitution.”155 However, examining how living-constitution theories
apply to what we assume was an erroneous decision in Williamson
County reveals common ground. For purposes of this analysis, we use
the term “living constitution” to describe all relevant non-originalist
theories of precedent, though we recognize that such theories differ
among themselves on the extent of change in constitutional

149. See Barrett, supra note 119, at 1733–36; cf. Michael J. Gerhardt, Super
Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204 (2006) (describing this concept).
150. See supra notes 122–29, 140–47.
151. See supra notes 122–150 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509
(1996); Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial
Restraint, 22 Const. Comment. 271 (2005) [hereinafter Merrill, Originalism]; Thomas
W. Merrill, The Conservative Case for Precedent, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 977
(2008); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988).
153. Merrill, Originalism, supra note 152, at 272.
154. See Section II.A.
155. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 3 (2010).
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interpretation that their advocates consider appropriate. We consider
Knick under the influential living-constitution approach to precedent
derived from the common-law method, and also a number of other
living-constitution approaches. We first explore the common-law
method primarily as advocated by Professor David Strauss. We then
go on to discuss additional living-constitution approaches as they relate
to Knick. These theories include Professor Lawrence Lessig’s theory
of constitutional fidelity through translation, Professor Richard
Fallon’s call for legal legitimacy using the reflective equilibrium theory,
Professor Randy Kozel’s “second-best stare decisis” theory, and
Professor Michael J. Gerhardt’s “reasoned elaboration” theory for
overruling.
While these theories have their differences, all place substantial
value on the workability of the precedent in question, the quality of the
Court’s reasoning, and the extent to which it has engendered strong
“reliance” interests. On these criteria, Williamson County was a
precedent ripe for reversal.
A. The Common-Law Approach

The common-law approach to precedent as it relates to the
overruling of Williamson County by Knick is described in this
subsection. First, we discuss the general concept of precedent that is
based on common-law tradition. We then apply the virtues identified
by Strauss as found in the common-law approach to constitutional
interpretation. The concept of precedent is said to be “‘[t]he most
distinctive characteristic of English law and American law’” based on
the common-law tradition.156 Common-law constitutionalism — which
holds that courts should interpret the Constitution by using methods
similar to those used by judges in developing the common-law — is one
of the most significant living-constitution approaches to constitutional
interpretation.157
The common-law method requires balancing the value of adhering
to tradition and precedent against retaining a rule of law that is
mistaken or unworkable.158 This tension was described by Justice

156. GARNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 16.
157. See STRAUSS, supra note 155, at 3 (noting that a “common law constitution is a
‘living’ constitution, but it is also one that can protect fundamental principles against
transient public opinion”).
158. See id. at xii, 77–97. See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). But see EDWARD H. LEVI,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 59 (2013) (noting that “constitutional
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Louis Brandeis as “reflecting the competing values of leaving the law
‘settled’ and getting the law ‘right.’”159
For reasons discussed earlier in this Article,160 Williamson County
got the law “wrong.” However, the ripeness requirement found in the
second prong of Williamson County was not really “settled” such that
takings claim litigants had adapted to this requirement, and its
overruling would disrupt the application of the law in practice. In fact,
litigants, judges, and scholars continued to criticize the ripeness
requirement and attempted to find ways to work around the law.161
Therefore, the tension between leaving the law settled and getting it
right was less severe than might have been the case with more widely
accepted precedents.
Relevant to Knick’s claim that her property had been “taken” by the
Township ordinance, regard for precedent is particularly strong in
property rights, contractual obligations, and commercial transactions
based on the likelihood of precedential reliance.162 Overruling a rule
of property precedent “may raise both reliance-based hardship and
takings concerns that are not present (or not as strongly present) in the
run-of-the-mill case.”163
Unlike the concerns animating the robust application of precedent
in cases where an owner may be deprived of a property interest by
overturning a prior decision, the overruling of Williamson County
actually increased the protection of private property rights. After
Knick, property owners are able to file a takings claim in federal court
without being required to first exhaust their claim in state court and
face preclusion in a federal forum.
How then does a common-law living constitutionalist deal with the
problem of precedent at issue in Knick where the Court must decide
whether to follow its earlier ruling in Williamson County? Professor
David Strauss, the leading academic proponent of common-law
constitutionalism, explains that the living Constitution should not be
viewed as “an invitation to the people in power to do what they want,”
but instead can “be based on an important set of virtues: intellectual

interpretation cannot be as consistent as case-law development or the application of
statutes”).
159. KOZEL, supra note 15, at 23 (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S.
393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
160. See supra Part I.
161. See Thomas Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 1289 HARV. L. REV.
1630, 1647–49 (2015).
162. KOZEL, supra note 15, at 28.
163. GARNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 434.
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humility, a sense of the complexity of the problems faced by our
society, a respect for the accumulated wisdom of the past, and a
willingness to rethink when necessary and when consistent with those
virtues.”164
These virtues can be found in the common-law approach to
constitutional interpretation, which relies on “over two centuries of
experience grappling with the fundamental issues — constitutional
issues — that arise in a large, complex, diverse, changing society.”165
Although some of the lessons learned may become part of the text of
the Constitution through amendments, the “precedents, traditions, and
understandings” from our experience informs how the Constitution
operates in practice as our living Constitution.166 Strauss also
emphasizes the importance of the workability of the precedent in
question, and its consistency with other, more recent precedents.167 In
addition, he argues that common-law constitutional jurists can
sometimes take account of considerations of “fairness” and “social
policy,” albeit only in limited ways.168
Strauss also points out some areas of practice in which constitutional
law contradicts the text of the Constitution.169 For example, he claims
that following the text of the Constitution would allow: a state to have
an established church; states to disenfranchise certain people based on
being poor or gay because the right to vote is not protected by the
Equal Protection Clause; the federal government to discriminate on
the basis of race or sex because the Equal Protection clause only
applies to the states; and several other anomalies.170 Instead, Strauss
argues that “[i]n most litigated cases, constitutional law resembles the
common-law much more closely than it resembles a text-based system”
and that the text of the Constitution “will be most important when
there are not a lot of subsequent precedents ‘interpreting’ it.”171
Therefore, Strauss believes “that provisions of the Constitution
function roughly in the same way as precedents in a common-law

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

STRAUSS, supra note 155, at 139.
Id. at 34–35.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 83
Id. at 38–39.
David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129

HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015).
170. Id. at 3.
171. Id. at 4–5.
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system” and thus allows for an evolutionary understanding of
constitutional law based on the common-law approach.172
The Straussian virtues of “intellectual humility” and a “willingness
to rethink when necessary”173 were on full display when the justices
who joined the Williamson County decision voiced criticism of the
state exhaustion requirement in a subsequent opinion, San Remo
Hotel. As discussed in Section II.A, in a concurring opinion in San
Remo Hotel, then-Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that Williamson
County had severe flaws, was inconsistent with the Court’s treatment
of other constitutional rights, and “ha[d] created some real anomalies,
justifying our revisiting the issue.”174 Justice Rehnquist wrote that
although he had joined the majority in Williamson County, he had
since come to believe that the state-litigation requirement of that ruling
“may have been mistaken.”175 Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence was
joined by three other members of the Court: Justices Anthony
Kennedy, Sandra Day O’Connor, and Clarence Thomas.176 Justice
O’Connor had also joined the Williamson County majority in 1985.177
Thus, the virtues underpinning the common-law constitutionalist
theory of precedent support the overruling of Williamson County.
Strauss’s criterion of workability also supports overruling
Williamson County. The Knick Court recognized the complexity of
the problems faced by litigants bringing takings claims and gave respect
for the accumulated wisdom of the past three decades as the
Williamson County ruling has been the object of widespread criticism
by legal scholars.178 The Catch-22 problem created by Williamson
County and subsequent rulings demonstrated the fundamentally
unworkable nature of the decision.179 The fact that takings defendants
could “remove” cases to federal court and then use the Williamson
County ripeness rule to get them dismissed further underscored its
unworkability.180

172. Id. at 5.
173. STRAUSS, supra note 155, at 139.
174. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 351
(2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
175. Id. at 348.
176. Id.
177. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
178. For examples of the many critiques, see Berger & Kanner, supra note 68, at 673;
Berger, supra note 68, at 102–03; Breemer, supra note 68; Buchsbaum, supra note 68,
at 47–74; Hawley, supra note 68; Radford & Thompson, supra note 68; Somin, Supreme
Court, supra note 68.
179. See supra Part I.
180. See supra Part I.
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The ripeness requirement in Williamson County created a complex
litigation problem for those trying to bring an inverse condemnation
claim under the Fifth Amendment. As noted above, the preWilliamson County cases cited by Justice Kagan in her dissent were
cases where compensation was “certain” because the government had
already conceded that a taking had occurred and payment was due.181
By contrast, inverse condemnation litigation requires a court to
determine whether a regulatory taking has occurred.182 It is the federal
court system that has developed a uniform approach to determining
whether a regulation has gone “too far” such that it is a taking requiring
just compensation.183
Finally, to the extent that considerations of “fairness” and “social
policy” are relevant to the overruling of precedent, these too weigh in
favor of the result in Knick. Barring an entire category of federal
constitutional claims from access to federal court was manifestly unfair,
and also put many takings plaintiffs at risk of being the victims of
biased or otherwise flawed state courts.184 It also undermined the
fundamental principle of ensuring a nation-wide minimum floor for
constitutional rights protected by the Bill of Rights.185
In so far as reliance interests should be considered as elements of
fairness or social policy, those protected by Williamson County were
nowhere near strong enough to justify retaining a seriously flawed
precedent.186 The reliance interests impacted by Knick could only be
claimed by the government in its attempt to regulate property owners
without paying just compensation.187 By requiring litigants asserting
inverse condemnation claims to seek a remedy in state court before
proceeding to federal court, state and local officials could delay or
avoid paying just compensation for excessive regulation by arguing for
dismissal on ripeness grounds if the plaintiff brought a claim in federal
court, or removing the case from state to federal court and then moving
to dismiss.188 If we accept the view that state courts will often be
friendlier to local government and officials based on political affinity,
property owners may prefer to have their claims heard in federal court,

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See supra Section II.B.
Merrill, supra note 161, at 1637.
See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
See supra Part I.
See Somin, Knick, supra note 2, at 181–83.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.A.
See Merrill, supra note 161, at 1667–68.
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particularly since the contours of regulatory takings law has been
developed in the federal system.189
B. Other Living-Constitution Approaches to Overruling Precedent

Other living-constitution approaches to overruling precedent also
weigh in favor of the Court’s decision in Knick. The next four
subsections explore how these four approaches support the overruling
of Williamson County and include Professor Lawrence Lessig’s theory
of constitutional fidelity through translation, Professor Richard
Fallon’s call for legal legitimacy using the reflective equilibrium theory,
and Professor Randy Kozel’s “second-best stare decisis” theory. The
Section concludes with a discussion of Professor Michael J. Gerhardt’s
“reasoned elaboration” theory for overruling as applied to Knick.

i. Interpretive Fidelity to Constitutional Meaning
Professor Lawrence Lessig argues that constitutional interpretation
must be grounded in fidelity. On this view, “the Court [should] read
the Constitution in light of the current interpretive context so as to
preserve its original meaning.”190 Translating a text into the current
context requires interpretive fidelity to constitutional meaning.191
Constitutional interpretation also requires fidelity to role, which
originated in the early constitutional law cases of Marbury v. Madison
(1803) and McCulloch v. Maryland (1819).192 In Marbury, according
to Lessig, Chief Justice John Marshall understood that in order to
secure the Supreme Court’s authority “to hold Congress to the
Constitution, and the president to the law and Constitution,” it would
need to set precedents to secure its power over time.193 This protection
of the Court into the future illustrates fidelity to role.194 In McCulloch,
the fidelity to role differs from the “external and foundational”
concern of Marbury and instead addresses the “internal and
pragmatic” concern that the Court should not be in the “business of
evaluating whether a law is really necessary or not.”195

189. See supra Part I.
190. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY & CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS
READ THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 212 (2019) (noting that this is “different from
saying the Court should read the Constitution as the Framers would have”).
191. Id. at 71.
192. Id. at 19.
193. Id. at 36.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 42.
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Chief Justice Marshall broadly interpreted the Constitution’s
Necessary and Proper Clause to allow Congress to establish a national
bank.196 Here, on Lessig’s account, fidelity to role was served by
ensuring the Court would be able to apply the law consistently. By
allowing Congress to decide what is necessary, the Court avoids
drawing the lines between what is “really necessary” and what is not,
thus reducing the possibility of artificial distinctions that make
precedent difficult to follow.197
The Court adheres to fidelity of role “internally” by avoiding
conflicting decisions and “externally” by maintaining a stable
institution to decide future cases.198 The external constraints on
fidelity to role dictate that courts should proceed cautiously when
tracking the “evolution of social meanings so as not to lead a trend,
even if they believe the trend is correct, such as in the case of
marriage.”199 Recognizing that “our tradition has allowed the Supreme
Court a jurisdiction to say what the social meaning is,” Lessig argues
that “social and political context inevitably and appropriately plays a
significant role, especially for courts within a democracy.”200 This
context is a constraint on constitutionalism as well as “an ongoing
assurance that the Constitution will not become too remote.”201
As discussed above in Part III, Williamson County did not present a
significant constitutional interpretation problem because the Court
failed to attempt to square the state-exhaustion requirement with the
text of the Fifth Amendment. Both in the Court’s opinion and in
justifications put forward subsequently by defenders of the ruling, the
only rationales offered are pragmatic concerns and non-originalist
doctrinal considerations.202 Thus, Lessig’s call for fidelity to meaning
is not relevant to Knick’s overruling of precedent. However, Lessig’s
call for fidelity to role presents external constraints on courts and
encourages them to go slow in tracking changes occurring in the social
and the political context.
The Williamson County precedent from 1985 prevailed for decades,
frustrating property owners and critics of the state exhaustion ripeness

196. Id. at 38–42.
197. Id. at 41–42.
198. Id. at 451–52.
199. Id. at 452–53.
200. Id. at 447–54.
201. Id. at 456.
202. For an overview and critique of these rationales, see Somin, Knick, supra note
2, at 157–71, 180–86.
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requirement.203 It was questioned by four justices in 2005 in the San
Remo Hotel decision, when the logical outcome of the requirement
resulted in the Court holding that a final decision in a takings case from
a state court precluded re-litigation of the same issue in federal
court.204 In 1997 and again in 2013, the Court recast the state
exhaustion requirement as a “prudential” ripeness rule, rather than as
an element of a takings claim.205 To make matters worse, some state
and local governments defended against takings claims by removing
the state case to federal court and then successfully moving for
dismissal based on the property owner’s failure to “exhaust” state court
remedies — a failure caused by the defendant’s own decision to remove
the case.206 With over 30 years of litigation frustration for property
owners, removal mischief perpetrated by state and local government
defendants, and criticism from scholars and practitioners, the Knick
Court was true to its fidelity to role. It allowed the mistaken precedent
to evolve over three decades before overturning it, thus promoting the
external aspects of maintaining a stable institution to decide future
cases.

ii. The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy: The Reflective Equilibrium
Theory
In reframing the debates propounded by “originalists” and “living
constitutionalists,” Professor Richard H. Fallon focuses on the
legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s authority and states “the Court’s
principal function is to determine what prior authorities — and, in
particular, the Constitution — have decided or established, and to
apply the dictates of prior authorities to the cases that come before
it.”207 Fallon identifies three major considerations that bear on the
Court’s legitimacy in cases where we believe the justices have made a
mistake. First, the justices must “exhibit reasonable judgment about

203. See supra Part I.
204. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
205. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178(2019) (citing Horne v. Dep’t
of Agric., 569 U.S. 513, 525–26 (2013)); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520
U.S. 725, 733–34 (1997)).
206. See, e.g., Warner v. City of Marathon, 718 F. App’x 834, 388 (11th Cir. 2017)
(removed takings claim dismissed under Williamson County); Reahard v. Lee County,
30 F.3d 1412, 1414 (11th Cir. 1994) (same). The Supreme Court ruled that such
“removal” shenanigans were permissible, despite the fact that the removed claim
would not be “ripe” under Williamson County. See City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of
Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163–66 (1997).
207. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 10
(2018).
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what they can do within the bounds of the law. Second, the [j]ustices
must exhibit good, or at least reasonable, practical[,] and moral
judgment.”208 Third, the justices must “support their judgments with
arguments that they advance in good faith.”209
In the Knick decision, Justice Roberts analyzed several factors that
are similar to the considerations Fallon identified to support the
Court’s legitimacy in overruling a mistaken precedent.210 In Part IV of
the opinion, Justice Roberts addressed the question of “whether we
should overrule Williamson County, or whether stare decisis counsels
in favor of adhering to the decision, despite its error.”211 Chief Justice
Roberts exhibited reasonable judgment about what the Court can do
within the bounds of the law by using factors identified by the Court to
decide whether to overrule a past decision.212 These factors included
“the quality of [its] reasoning, the workability of the rule it established,
its consistency with other related decisions, . . . and reliance on the
decision.”213
The Court analyzed each factor in detail and concluded with the
statement, “[i]n light of all the foregoing, the dissent cannot, with
respect, fairly maintain its extreme assertions regarding our application
of the principle of stare decisis.”214 This concluding statement indicates
that the majority justices believed they were exhibiting good practical
and moral judgment in overruling Williamson County and that they
had supported their judgment with strong, good-faith arguments
sufficient to address the dissent’s concerns.
Building on the practice-based theory of law from Professor H.L.A.
Hart, Fallon sets out seven rules of constitutional practice that bind the
Supreme Court as follows215:
1.
The Justices’ rulings must be “mandated by or
consistent with” the authority of the Constitution but
understanding that the Constitution requires interpretation.216
As we expressed previously, we believe that the Knick decision
is consistent with the Fifth Amendment and that overruling

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 11.
See Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2177–78 (2019).
Id.
See id. at 2178.
Id. (citing Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018)).
Id. at 2179.
See FALLON, JR., supra note 207, at 98–102.
Id. at 98.
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2.
The justices must sometimes choose from various
rules of interpretation to achieve legal validity, such as choosing
precedential meaning over original meaning.217 The Knick
decision did not require the justices to choose precedential
meaning over original meaning as the state-exhaustion doctrine
from Williamson County was not a constitutional interpretation
of the Fifth Amendment.
3.
The justices “should maintain reasonable stability in
constitutional doctrine” even when they do not agree with the
reasoning and the resulting rule.218 The ripeness doctrine
espoused by the Williamson County decision caused instability
in litigating Fifth Amendment constitutional claims over the last
three decades, and its overruling should return stability to
takings claims.
4.
The justices must maintain stability and sometimes
forgo their view as to what would be constitutionally best in the
interest of achieving legal clarity.219 Knick’s decision to
overrule the state-exhaustion ripeness doctrine will promote
legal clarity in the litigation of takings claims by eliminating the
“Catch-22” experienced by property owners in seeking just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
5.
Justices are obligated to maintain stable
understandings unless “sufficiently powerful legal or moral
considerations call for a different course.”220 The multifactor
test used by the Supreme Court to determine whether to
overrule its precedent does not help discern “the central
consideration, which involves the egregiousness of the alleged
error — as measured in both moral and legal terms — as well as
the costs of correcting it.”221 Justice Roberts aptly characterized
the egregiousness of the error in Williamson County as “not just
wrong.
Its reasoning was exceptionally ill-founded and
conflicted with much of our takings jurisprudence.”222
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See id. at 98–99.
Id. at 99.
See id. at 99–100.
Id. at 100.
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Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178 (2019).
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6.
Justices should accept historical precedent that is
reasonably just and practical. However, if adhering to
precedent produces a result that is not reasonably just, the
justices should reconsider the question of the precedent’s
validity.223 Williamson County produced results that were not
just by requiring adherence to a ripeness doctrine that
precluded many takings plaintiffs from pursuing their takings
claims in federal court as provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.224
7.
“Justices should resolve doubts about proper
interpretations and priorities of authority” with an eye to
legitimacy concerns that may require them to make partly moral
judgments.225 Justice Roberts noted that “the force of stare
decisis is ‘reduced’ when rules that do not ‘serve as a guide to
lawful behavior’ are at issue” and “holding that uncompensated
takings violate the Fifth Amendment will not expose
governments to new liability.”226 Just compensation requires
some moral judgment about what is “just” and allowing a
property owner to bring a takings claim under § 1983 will
provide them the opportunity to receive just compensation
under federal takings jurisprudence.
Fallon proposes the “reflective equilibrium theory,” grounded in
existing practice, to transcend the existing constitutional theories of
originalism and living constitutionalism and sharpen our “thinking
about how Supreme Court decision making could best promote legal
and moral legitimacy while simultaneously exemplifying an ideal of
constitutional argument in good faith.”227 The reflective equilibrium
model, drawn from moral and political philosophy elaborated by John
Rawls in A Theory of Justice, provides insights for constitutional law
in so far as it aims for principled consistency.228 Fallon proposes that
we “recognize the need to balance adaptability with argumentative
good faith” and allow justices to clarify, refine, or even change their
interpretive methodology based “upon further reflection triggered by
the facts or imperatives of an unanticipated case.”229 In other words,
the Court’s legitimacy is strengthened by using good practical and
moral judgment when questioning precedent and by supporting its
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See FALLON, JR., supra note 207, at 101.
See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2179.
FALLON, JR., supra note 207, at 101.
Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2179.
FALLON, JR., supra note 207, at 125–27.
See id. at 143–44. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
FALLON, JR., supra note 207, at 153–54.
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judgment with strong and good-faith arguments that demonstrate
adaptability and reflection based on the facts of the case before them.
Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor joined the majority opinion in
Williamson County. While they were not present for its overruling in
Knick, they called for its eventual reversal in their San Remo Hotel
concurrence, also joined by Justices Thomas and Kennedy.230 We
doubt there are many Supreme Court decisions where two of the
justices who decided the original precedent later admitted their
decision might well have been mistaken. These justices in the San
Remo Hotel concurrence exemplify the reflective equilibrium model
by showing a willingness to question precedent in good faith. In the
unanticipated case of San Remo Hotel, the plaintiffs were precluded
from relitigating their takings claims in a Section 1983 action because
the issues were already adjudicated by the state court.231 The facts and
resulting imperative of res judicata in the San Remo Hotel case
triggered further reflection by the justices to revisit the issue because
of the real anomalies the state-litigation rule created.232 Justice
Rehnquist noted that he joined the Williamson County opinion “[b]ut
further reflection and experience lead me to think that the
justifications for its state-litigation requirement are suspect, while its
impact on takings plaintiffs is dramatic.”233 What better illustration of
using Fallon’s reflective equilibrium theory to transcend the existing
constitutional theories of originalism and living constitutionalism?

iii. The “Second-Best Stare Decisis” Theory
In his book, Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent, Professor
Randy J. Kozel develops a “theory of precedent designed to enhance
the stability and impersonality of constitutional law” by rethinking how
stare decisis interacts with constitutional theory.234 In his “second-best
stare decisis” theory, which is intended to appeal to both originalists
and living constitutionalists,235 Kozel attempts to narrow the factors
relevant to deciding whether to retain or overrule a precedent to
include only those that could be applied by justices who have distinctly
different theories of constitutional interpretation.236

230. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 348
(2005) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
231. See id. at 347–48.
232. See id. at 351.
233. Id. at 352.
234. KOZEL, supra note 15, at 6.
235. Id. at 94–99.
236. See id. at 13.
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Recognizing that his approach “has some features in common with
the doctrine of stare decisis that currently operates at the Supreme
Court,” Kozel identifies these factors to include “a decision’s
procedural workability, the accuracy of its factual premises, and the
reliance it has yielded.”237 Knick addresses all three of these factors.
It found that the Williamson County state-litigation requirement is
“unworkable in practice” because of the preclusive effect of a state
court’s decision resolving a takings claim in a subsequent federal
forum.238 The Court also determined that the factual accuracy or
quality of the precedent’s reasoning was lacking, in that the reasoning
in Williamson County “was exceptionally ill-founded and conflicted
with much of our takings jurisprudence.”239 Finally, the Court found
“no reliance interests on the state-litigation requirement,”240 a
conclusion supported by the likely practical impact of overruling
Williamson County.241
The most significant departure from current practice that Kozel
proposes relates to a precedent’s substantive effects, the relevance of
which depends on a Justice’s theory of constitutional interpretation.
Kozel asserts that the decision whether or not to follow precedent
should not include the substantive effects unless the judge in question
views the precedent as “extraordinarily harmful.”242 Ignoring the
substantive effects of Williamson County is difficult given that the
effect of the ripeness requirement is to preclude a plaintiff from
litigating a takings claim in federal court. It is the substantive effect of
this rule that makes it mistaken. Thus, at least in the Knick case, we
would argue that substantive effects should not be excluded because
they must be considered as part of the process of examining the
accuracy of the precedent’s factual premises. It might also be possible
to interpret Robert’s language in Knick to conclude that he indeed
views the precedent as extraordinarily harmful.243 But, even if we

237. Id.
238. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178–79 (2019).
239. Id. at 2178.
240. Id. at 2179.
241. See supra Section II.A (discussing reliance interests).
242. KOZEL, supra note 15, at 14.
243. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167 (concluding “that the state-litigation requirement
imposes an unjustifiable burden on takings plaintiffs, conflicts with the rest of our
takings jurisprudence, and must be overruled”); see also id. at 2169–70 (holding that
“the state-litigation requirement relegates the Takings Clause ‘to the status of a poor
relation’ among the provisions of the Bill of Rights . . . .” and that “ [f]idelity to the
Takings Clause and our cases construing it requires overruling Williamson County and
restoring takings claims to the full-fledged constitutional status the Framers envisioned
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completely ignore substantive effects, the overruling of Williamson
County was amply justified under Kozel’s criteria of workability,
factual accuracy, and lack of strong reliance interests.
Alternatively, Kozel proposes an approach focused on the structure
of Supreme Court decision-making that would require a supermajority
vote to overrule a precedent.244 Such a requirement would compel
cooperation among the justices and “lower the chances that a
precedent will be jettisoned due to nothing more than personnel shifts
— and accompanying changes in the Court’s interpretive locus.”245 It
is unclear whether the Knick Court could have obtained a
supermajority vote through compromise, particularly because it
followed so quickly after the overruling of another precedent in
Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt.246

iv. Reasoned Elaboration of the Criteria Used for Overruling
Professor Michael J. Gerhardt observes that there continues to be
confusion over the Court’s criteria for overruling prior cases.247 He
discounts Professor Jerrold Israel’s findings from his classic 1963 study
on overruling prior cases that the reasons given by the justices “fell into
three categories: changed conditions, the lessons of experience
(including unworkability), and conflicting precedents.”248 While
Gerhardt accepts that the Court has “generally grounded its
overrulings on one or more of these reasons,” he argues that these
criteria may be manipulated too easily.249 Some justices may use
changed conditions to overrule a decision, and others argue that it is
the legislature that should take these conditions into account.250 In
addition, conflicting precedents have not necessarily yielded
overrulings, and the justices have disagreed over “what would qualify
as a lesson of experience requiring an explicit overruling.”251
Applying the criteria identified by Israel would give minimal
guidance to the Court in deciding whether to overrule Williamson
when they included the Clause among the other protections in the Bill of Rights”
(quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994)).
244. See KOZEL, supra note 15, at 15–16.
245. Id. at 16.
246. See 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019).
247. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 109 (1991).
248. Id. at 109 (citing Jerrold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The “Art” of
Overruling, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 211, 219–23 (1963)).
249. Id. at 110–11.
250. See id.
251. Id. at 111.
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First, the conditions involved in asserting an inverse
condemnation claim have undergone only limited change since the
Court recognized a regulatory taking in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon.252 Granted, there have been multiple Supreme Court cases
guiding litigants and judges in determining whether “the regulation
goes too far,” but the refinement of theory has not changed the basic
idea that an individual property owner should not have to bear the
burdens of regulation that should be borne by the public as a whole.253
Williamson County created a ripeness rule that denied regulatory
taking claimants the opportunity to bring their claims in federal
court.254 Few other conditions have changed regarding the efficacy of
regulatory takings claims, though post-Williamson County decisions
have revealed additional flaws in the workability of the stateexhaustion requirement, and exacerbated the “Catch-22” it creates.255
Similarly, there are no conflicting precedents regarding the state
exhaustion requirement from Williamson County, only widespread
criticism of the decision by lawyers, judges (including the original
justices who decided the case), and scholars.256 The main grounds that
would support Knick’s overruling of precedent, under the Israel
criteria, are the lessons of experience (including unworkability) after
more than three decades of litigation frustration from the “Catch-22”
created by Williamson County.257
Gerhardt also disagrees with the approach suggested by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, which calls for less than the usual deference to
precedents when the prior decisions were the result of a 5–4 vote with
vigorous dissents.258 The Williamson County decision would not have
qualified for a less than deferential approach to precedent under
Justice Rehnquist’s theory as it was a 7–1 vote with Justice Harry
Blackmun’s majority decision joined by Justices Rehnquist, Stevens,
and O’Connor and concurrences by Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Marshall and Stevens.259 Justice Byron White dissented on the grounds

252. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (noting that the “general rule at least is that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking”).
253. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960).
254. See Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178 (2019).
255. See supra Part I.
256. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2178.
257. See id. at 2177–78.
258. See Gerhardt, supra note 247, at 112 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
826 (1991)).
259. See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985).

2020]

OVERTURNING A CATCH-22

587

that the issues were not ripe for decision, and Justice Lewis Powell did
not take part in the decision.260
Instead, Gerhardt calls for a reasoned elaboration of the criteria the
Court uses for overruling, including the reasoning of the individual
justices as to why they rejected or adhered to the precedent.261 By
openly and fully discussing their reasoning, the justices will help assure
people the Court takes precedent seriously for the purpose of
preserving “social or institutional values of stability and continuity in
constitutional law.”262 In Knick, both the majority and the dissent fully
discussed their reasoning in rejecting or upholding Williamson
County.263 Even though Knick was a 5–4 decision, the overruling of
precedent came after allowing three decades of litigation experience to
test the workability of the state ripeness doctrine.264
Two of the justices who originally joined in the Williamson County
decision later recognized the wrongness of the state-exhaustion
requirement, and there were many critics of the holding because it
denied property owners the right to litigate their Fifth Amendment
challenges in federal court.265 Justice Roberts clearly stated his
reasoning as to why the precedent was erroneous and why it deserved
to be overruled under the criteria established by the Court’s
jurisprudence.266 The dissent similarly outlined its reasoning as to why
the precedent was correct and should be sustained.267 Based on the
Court’s full and open discussion of its reasoning, observers should take
heart in the Court’s thorough attempt to preserve the rule of law and
recognize the importance of constraint and stability.
CONCLUSION

If, as the Supreme Court concluded in Knick, Williamson County
was wrongly decided, the doctrine of stare decisis did not justify
retaining it. That is true under the Supreme Court’s current criteria for
overruling precedent. It is also true under leading originalist and living

260. See, e.g., James G. Wilson, Taking Stare Decisis Seriously, A Cautionary Tale
for a Progressive Supreme Court, 10 J. JURIS. 327, 330 (2011) (discussing initial
distribution of votes in the Supreme Court as well as concurrences).
261. See Gerhardt, supra note 247, at 147.
262. Id.
263. See generally Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
264. See id. at 2178.
265. See supra Section IV.B.ii (discussing the San Remo decision).
266. See Knick, 139 S. Ct at 2177–79.
267. See id. at 2183–90 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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constitutionalist theories of precedent, except perhaps those that
require near-absolute deference to established doctrine.
Other recent Supreme Court decisions may, perhaps, raise
legitimate concerns about the extent to which the Court might embark
on unjustified reversals of precedent. However, such fears are
misplaced when it comes to Knick’s reversal of Williamson County.
It is still possible to argue that Williamson County should have been
retained in order to forestall reversal of other, more defensible
precedents. Perhaps any reversal of precedent risks creating a
dangerous slippery slope. But, unless we are committed to the idea
that all precedents should be left undisturbed, no matter how
problematic they are, it makes little sense to argue for maintaining a
precedent whose overruling is amply justified merely because the
Court might later go on reverse better precedent. If the justices are
willing and able to apply criteria for overruling precedent impartially,
then they should be able to tell the difference between a case that easily
fits the relevant criteria — as Williamson County did — and one that
does not. Overruling Williamson County was an easy case because it
was justified on a wide range of different criteria.
If, on the other hand, invocations of stare decisis are merely
smokescreens for the justices’ jurisprudential or political objectives,
then it still makes little sense to keep dubious precedents in place
merely to protect others whose retention is proper. If the justices are
willing to set aside stare decisis whenever it is convenient to do so,268
then leaving Williamson County on the books would not prevent them
from overruling other precedents in the future, especially if getting rid
of them is an important priority of their judicial philosophy or their
wing of the court.
This Article does not attempt to resolve the issue of what is
ultimately the best approach to stare decisis. Nor do we attempt to
determine whether the justices genuinely care about stare decisis, to
the extent of being willing to leave in place precedents they believe are
seriously misguided.269 We do, however, conclude that Knick’s

268. For a recent argument that the conservative justices do not genuinely care
about stare decisis, see Aaron Belkin & Sean McElwee, Don’t Be Fooled. Chief Justice
Roberts Is as Partisan as They Come, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/07/opinion/john-roberts-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cc/LM78-9XA5].
269. One of us recently expressed skepticism about both the claim that wrong
constitutional precedent should routinely be protected from reversal, and the idea that
either liberal or conservative justices are routinely willing to support precedents they
consider to be badly misguided, as opposed to relatively minor mistakes. See Ilya
Somin, The Rights and Wrongs of Overruling Precedent, REASON: VOLOKH
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overturning of Williamson County was justified under a wide range of
jurisprudential theories of precedent.

CONSPIRACY (June 26, 2019), https://reason.com/2019/06/26/the-rights-and-wrongs-ofoverruling-precedent/ [https://perma.cc/S6VR-A6ZS].

